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What About the Victims?
Domestic Violence, Hearsay, and the
Confrontation Clause in the Aftermath
of Davis v. Washington
STACEY GAUTHIER
I.

E

∗

INTRODUCTION

stimates state “approximately 1.5 million women and

834,732 men are raped and/or physically assaulted by an
intimate partner annually in the United States.”1
In June 2006, in Davis v. Washington, the United States
Supreme Court [hereinafter “U.S. Supreme Court” or “the
Court”] held that statements made to law enforcement
officials in the following circumstances are testimonial in
nature and thus inadmissible if the victim is unavailable to
testify at trial and was not previously subject to crossexamination:2 “[W]hen the circumstances objectively indicate
that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”3
This holding resolved the ambiguity in the Court’s 2004
Crawford v. Washington4 decision as to what constitutes a
testimonial statement. Unfortunately for victims of domestic
∗

Stacey Gauthier, J.D., Southern New England School of Law
(2007); B.S., University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth (2003). The
author would like to thank Professor Kevin Connelly for the direction and
expertise he provided to her throughout the initial writing of the paper.
1
Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, U.S. Dep’t of Just., NCJ
181867, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence,
at iii (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubssum/181867.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2007).
2
Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273-74, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224,
237 (2006).
3
Id.
4
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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violence, in resolving that ambiguity, the Court created a
hurdle to prosecuting this special type of case. The extension
of the Confrontation Clause in Davis is unwarranted,
outweighed by the need for effective law enforcement, and
cost prohibitive.
This article analyzes the Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation, admission of hearsay statements, and the effect
of the Davis decision on the prosecution of domestic violence
cases. Part II discusses the history of the Confrontation
Clause. Part III discusses hearsay prior to Crawford. Parts
IV, V, and VI discuss the landmark cases Crawford v.
Washington, Commonwealth v. Gonsalves,5 and Davis v.
Washington, respectively, with regard to whether statements
made to police are admissible when the declarant is not
available to testify at trial. The reasons why the Supreme
Court’s extension of the Confrontation Clause is unwarranted
are contained in Part VII. The comparison of effective law
enforcement and individual liberty is discussed in Part VIII
with emphasis on constitutional rights and the functions of
the police. Part IX discusses the use of expert testimony in
domestic violence cases. Part X addresses the Forfeiture by
Wrongdoing Doctrine in response to the Court’s suggested
use of this hearsay exception. The article concludes in Part
XI with a hypothetical case that could cause the Davis
decision to change.
II.

HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

The Confrontation Clause is found in the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to … be confronted with the witnesses against him”6
It is applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment.7 The right to confront one’s accusers can be

5

Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
6
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traced back to Roman law.8 However, the source of the Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation is English law.
England used a system of common law as well as
elements of the civil law system.9 Common law uses the
adversarial system, where lawyers for opposing parties
present the evidence and the legal arguments to a neutral
decision-maker.10 Under this system, counter-argument and
cross-examination are used to test the truthfulness of the
opposing party’s case.11 Civil law uses the inquisitorial
system, where an examining magistrate questions the accused
and the witnesses and gathers other evidence.12 In this
system, the examining magistrate investigates as well as
adjudicates the case, and attorneys play a limited role.13 In
the sixteenth century, two statutes were passed which
required, in felony cases, justices of the peace to examine the
parties and certify the results for the court.14 Since these
statutes were passed during the reign of Queen Mary they
were called the Marian Bail and Committal Statutes.15 In
some instances the results of the examinations were used as
evidence at trial.16
One of the most infamous occurrences was the trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh for treason in 1603.17 At the time of
Raleigh’s trial, a person accused of treason had no right to
counsel and was not normally informed of the specific

8

Frank R. Herrmann, S.J. and Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the
Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause,
34 VA. J. INT’L L. 481, 483 (1994).
9
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.
10
Daniel L. Dreisbach, B.A., Ph.D., J.D, Criminal Procedure,
MICROSOFT ENCARTA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, §§II, II B (2007),
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761570809_1/Criminal_Procedure.
html.
11
Id. at § II B.
12
Id. at §§ II, II A.
13
Id. at § II A.
14
Crawford 541 U.S. at 43-44.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 44.
17
Herrmann, supra note 8, at 481-82.
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charges until the beginning of the trial.18 Raleigh’s accuser,
Lord Cobham, made accusations against Raleigh in a pretrial
examination, which was then read in court during Raleigh’s
trial, even though Cobham had subsequently recanted.19
Raleigh denied the allegations and requested three times that
Cobham be brought into court to voice his accusations to
Raleigh’s face.20 The court refused and Raleigh was
convicted and sentenced to death.21 In response, England
developed a right of confrontation, as well as strict rules
requiring that the witness actually be unavailable to testify
before allowing examinations to be read.22
The issue of the right to cross-examination arose in the
1696 English case King v. Paine.23 In this case, the court
ruled that although the witness was dead, his examination
was inadmissible because the defendant did not have a prior
chance to cross-examine him.24 In 1848, Parliament made
the requirement of a prior opportunity for cross-examination
explicit.25
Examination practices used in the Colonies were also
used controversially.26 Although some colonies, including
Massachusetts, guaranteed a right of confrontation in their
declaration of rights;27 the proposed Federal Constitution did
18

RALEIGH TREVELYAN, SIR WALTER RALEIGH 371 (Henry Holt
2002). There was also no presumption of innocence until proven guilty at
this time either. Id. at 370-71.
19
Id. at 364, 374, 380.
20
Id. at 380-82, 384. Raleigh also argued that under common law
there should be a trial with witnesses. The court responded that it was to
be done by examination. Id. at 381.
21
Id. at 386, 387.
22
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44-45 (2004).
23
Id. at 45 (citing King v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B.
1696)).
24
Id.
25
Id. at 47.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 48 (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (McGraw-Hill 1971)). See Virginia Declaration
of Rights § 8; Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights §IX; Delaware
Declaration of Rights § 14; Maryland Declaration of Rights § XIX; North
Carolina Declaration of Rights § VII; Vermont Declaration of Rights Ch.
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not.28 The lack of a right of confrontation clause was
objected to at the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention as
well as in a letter written by the Federal Farmer.29 As a
result, the First Congress included a right to confrontation in
what became the Sixth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution.30
III.

HEARSAY PRIOR TO CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON

The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.”31 The statement can be an
oral or written assertion or nonverbal conduct as long as it is
intended to be an assertion.32 Hearsay statements are
disfavored because they are not challenged through crossexamination.33 On the other hand, hearsay exceptions exist
due to the “strong necessity” for evidence that would
normally be inadmissible.34 Hearsay statements have
historically been allowed in evidence when the statements

1 § X; Massachusetts Declaration of Rights § XII; New Hampshire Bill of
Rights § XV, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra at 235, 265, 278, 282, 287,
323, 342, 377.
28
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48.
29
Id. at 48-49. Mr. Holmes stated to the President at the
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, “the mode of trial is altogether
indetermined; … whether the criminal… is to be allowed to meet his
accuser face to face; whether he is to be allowed to confront the
witnesses, and have the advantage of cross-examination, we are not yet
told.” Reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 690. In a letter written
by The Federal Farmer on October 12, 1787, the writer states that
“[n]othing can be more essential than the cross examining witnesses, and
generally before the triers of the facts in question. The common people
can establish facts with much more ease with oral than written evidence.”
Reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note27, at 473.
30
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48-49.
31
FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
32
FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
33
HON. PAUL J. LIACOS ET AL., HANDBOOK OF MASS. EVIDENCE 464
(Aspen 7th ed. 1999).
34
Id. at 477.
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were made under circumstances in which reliability was
ensured, and when no better evidence was available.35
Before the Court’s decision in Crawford, hearsay
statements were divided into four categories: “(1) prior
statements by witnesses who testify in the present proceeding
under oath and are subject to cross-examination concerning
their prior statement; (2) former testimony of presently
unavailable witnesses; (3) other hearsay falling within a
‘firmly rooted’ exception; and (4) hearsay not falling within a
‘firmly rooted’ exception.”36 The Crawford decision does
not affect the first two categories of hearsay statements, but it
greatly changes the treatment of statements in the last two.37
Prior to Crawford, a statement made by an unavailable
declarant was admissible when the statement contained
“adequate ‘indicia of reliability’” [hereinafter the “Roberts
Test”].38 To meet the Roberts Test, the Court determined that
the evidence must fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay
exception” or contain “particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness” (non-firmly rooted exception).39
According to the Court, when hearsay falls within a
“firmly rooted exception,” the Confrontation Clause is likely
satisfied.40 Many exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence
35

Id. at 464.
OLIN GUY WELLBORN III, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE RULES
OF EVIDENCE 257 (Thompson/West 2005).
37
Id. at 257-58.
38
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (In Roberts, the issue was
whether the defendant’s constitutional rights were violated when the trial
court admitted the transcript of a witness’s testimony at a preliminary
hearing, when the witness did not testify at the defendant’s trial. Id. at 58.
The Court held that normally when a declarant does not testify at trial
there must be a showing that the declarant is actually unavailable. Id. at
66. In this case, the statement must contain “indicia of reliability.” Id.
The Court explained that when a hearsay statement falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception reliability can be inferred. Id. If the hearsay
statement does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception the
statement must contain “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” or
it must be excluded. Id. The Roberts “indicia of reliability” test was used
prior to the Court’s decision in Crawford.).
39
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
40
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,347 (1992).
36
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qualify as firmly rooted exceptions.41 The Court specifically
identified excited utterances, statements made for medical
treatment, and statements made by co-conspirators as
qualifying exceptions.42 The Court reasoned that certain
‘firmly rooted’ hearsay exceptions have such solid
foundations that almost any statements that fall within them
would comply with the Constitutional requirements.43 For
example, the spontaneous utterance exception, which has
existed for the last two centuries, is currently recognized by
four-fifths of the states, and the Federal Rules of Evidence.44
As late as 1992, the Court stated in White v. Illinois, “a
statement that qualifies for admission under a ‘firmly rooted’
hearsay exception is so trustworthy that adversarial testing
can be expected to add little to its reliability.”45
For statements that do not fall within a “firmly rooted”
hearsay exception, the Supreme Court held that it would only
satisfy the Confrontation Clause if the statement showed
“particularized
guarantees
of
trustworthiness.”46
“Particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” must be based
on the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the making
of the statement, not on the other evidence that corroborates
it.47 For example, in Idaho v. Wright, the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Idaho’s refusal to admit
statements regarding sexual abuse made by a three-year-old
girl to a doctor because the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the doctor’s questioning was unreliable (he did
not videotape the interview and he used leading questions).
However, the victim’s statements were corroborated by
physical evidence and the testimony of the victim’s older
sister.48 In the non-firmly rooted exception it is up to the

41

E.g., FED. R. EVID 801(d)(2); FED R. EVID. 803; FED. R. EVID. 804.
White, 502 U.S. at 347.
43
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
44
White, 502 U.S. at 355 n.8.
45
Id. at 357.
46
Roberts, 488 U.S. at 66.
47
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990).
48
Id. at 809, 812-813.
42
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judge to decide whether a statement is reliable, which factors
to consider, and how much weight to give them.49
When the Court decided Crawford, in March of 2004,
merely 12 years after White, and with seven of the same
Justices, it had a very different idea about what types of
hearsay statements would satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
IV.

CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON

In the 2004 landmark case, Crawford v. Washington, the
U.S. Supreme Court overruled the decades-old “indicia of
reliability” test from Ohio v. Roberts, greatly limiting the
types of out-of-court statements admissible in evidence.
In Crawford, the Court held the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment prohibits out-of-court statements,
which are testimonial in nature, to be allowed into evidence
unless the declarant is unavailable and the opponent had a
prior opportunity for cross-examination.50 However, the
Court declined to give a complete definition of the word
testimonial except to say that it included “at a minimum …
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury,
or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”51 The Court
also failed to articulate what it meant by “police
interrogation.”52
The vague definitions of testimonial and “police
interrogation” caused confusion among state and federal
courts all over the country in trying to interpret what the
Court meant.53 Lower courts were split on what types of
hearsay evidence were admissible if the declarant was
unavailable to testify. For example, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that statements made
during a 911 call are testimonial because they are made to the

49

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004).
Id. at 68-69.
51
Id.. at 68.
52
Id. at 68.
53
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 562, 574-75 (Mass.
2005).
50
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police.54 On the other hand, other courts found 911 calls not
testimonial when the caller was “focused on obtaining
urgently needed assistance, not contemplating the statement’s
potential use at trial.”55
A. Facts
Crawford, the defendant, was arrested for stabbing the
victim, Kenneth Lee, in Lee’s apartment on August 5, 1999.56
The police gave both Crawford and his wife Sylvia their
Miranda57 warnings and proceeded to interrogate them.58
Eventually, Crawford confessed that he and his wife had gone
to the victim’s apartment because the victim allegedly tried to
rape Sylvia and Crawford was mad.59 When they found the
victim, a fight broke out. The victim was stabbed and
Crawford’s hand cut.60
Crawford and Sylvia gave differing stories as to what
happened during the fight. Crawford claimed he saw the
victim reaching for something and got cut when he grabbed
for it.61 Sylvia claimed the victim went to hit Crawford and
that is when Crawford stabbed him; she did not see anything
in the victim’s hands.62
Crawford was charged with assault and attempted
murder; he claimed self-defense at trial.63 Due to the marital

54

Id. at 571 (citing United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d, 895, 933, 904
(6 Cir. 2005)).
55
Id. (citing Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 830 n. 22 (9th Cir.
2004); People v. Corella, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 770, 776 (2004); State v.
Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 211 (Me. 2004); People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d
875, 879 (N.Y. Crim.Ct. 2004); State v. Newell, Ohio Ct.App. No. 2004
CA 00264, 2005 WL 1364937 (May 31, 2005)).
56
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.
57
See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
58
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 38-39.
62
Id. at 39-40.
63
Id. at 40.
th
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privilege, Sylvia did not testify.64 Accordingly, under the
Statement Against Penal Interest hearsay exception, the
prosecution tried to introduce Sylvia’s tape-recorded
statements to police to show that Crawford did not act in selfdefense.65
Crawford argued that admitting the statements would
violate his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.66 The
trial court, using the Roberts test, admitted the statements
finding that they contained “particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.”67
The trial court reasoned that the
statements were trustworthy because Sylvia was an
eyewitness, she described the events to a “neutral” police
officer, and she was not shifting the blame but rather
corroborating Crawford’s story.68 The prosecution played the
tape at trial and Crawford was convicted.69
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the decision,
and the Washington Supreme Court reinstated the
conviction.70 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address the issue of whether the use of Sylvia’s
out-of-court statement violated Crawford’s right to
confrontation.71
B. Holding / Rationale
The Court determined that there are two “inferences”
about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.72 The first
inference is that the main evil which the Confrontation
Clause was designed to protect against was the civil-law
criminal procedure method and especially the use of ex parte
communications.73 From this, the Court found that the
64

Id.
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 40-41.
70
Id. at 41-42.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 50.
73
Id. at 50.
65
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Confrontation Clause applies to witnesses who bear
testimony.74 The court referred to a dictionary from the year
1828 finding the word “testimony” defined as “[a] solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact.”75 The Court did not
specifically define the word testimonial, but gave the
following examples:
[E]x parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits,
custodial examinations, prior testimony that
the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or
similar pretrial statements that declarants
would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorally …, extrajudicial statements …
contained in formalized testimonial materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions…[,] [statements that
were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use at
a later trial].76
According to the Court, these examples all have a
“common nucleus,” meaning, that the above are all formal
statements where the declarant is bearing testimony77
The Court also found police interrogations testimonial
because they resemble the examinations by justices of the
peace in England.78 In support of this finding, the Court
stated that England did not have a police force until the
nineteenth century and before that government officers
performed investigations, thus creating the same risk with
police officers as was created with other government figures

74

Id. at 51.
Id.
76
Id. at 51-52.
77
Id.
78
Id.
75
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in pre-nineteenth century England.79 However, the Court
refused to define “interrogation,” saying only that it should be
used in its “colloquial” sense.80
The second inference of the Confrontation Clause is that
the Framers allowed a testimonial statement of a witness
unavailable to testify only if the defendant had a previous
chance to cross-examine the witness.81 The Court determined
that the Sixth Amendment incorporated the common-law
right of confrontation.82 In Mattox v. United States, an 1895
case, the Court held prior testimony, from a trial or a
preliminary hearing, is inadmissible if the defendant does not
have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine.83
Historically, the Court excluded testimony where the
prosecution failed to show the witness was actually
unavailable.84 The hearsay exceptions as they existed at the
time of the framing of the Constitution were for nontestimonial statements, such as business records.85 However,
there was an exception for dying declarations, whether
testimonial or not.86
The Court rejected the Roberts Test because it claimed
that the Roberts Test differed from the above principles.
First, the Court found the Roberts Test to be too broad
because it applies the same analysis, regardless of whether
the statements are ex parte testimonial. Second, the Court
found it was too narrow because it allows statements in
evidence that are ex parte testimonial on only a finding of
reliability.87 The Court found the Roberts Test to be

79

Id. at 53.
Id. at 68, 53 n.4 (comparing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
300-301 (1980)).
81
Id. at 54-55.
82
Id. at 54.
83
Id. at 57 (discussing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244
(1895)).
84
Id. (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722-25 (1968), and Motes
v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 470-71 (1900)).
85
Id. at 56.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 60.
80
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unpredictable and that it admitted statements the
Confrontation Clause was designed to keep out.88
The Court held that when non-testimonial hearsay is at
issue, state evidence law should apply; but where testimonial
evidence is at issue, the Confrontation Clause and common
law require that the witness be unavailable and that the
defendant have a prior opportunity for cross-examination.89
C. Concurring Opinion
In Crawford, there was no dissenting opinion; however,
Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justice O’Connor)
concurred in the judgment, disagreeing only with the Court’s
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.90
Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that, at common law,
un-sworn testimonial statements were not treated any
differently from non-testimonial statements.91 There was no
information that un-sworn testimonial statements were
excluded if they fell within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception.92 The right to cross-examination was to promote
the reliability of evidence against the accused in criminal
trials.93 Rehnquist noted that under some circumstances, outof-court statements are reliable by virtue of the conditions
under which they were made;94 such as statements made by
co-conspirators, excited utterances, statements made for
medical treatments, and dying declarations.95 Over one
hundred years ago, in Mattox, the Court declared “[t]he law
in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall not be
wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be
preserved to the accused.”96
88

Id. at 63.
Id. at 68.
90
Id. at 69.
91
Id. at 71.
92
Id. at 73.
93
Id. at 74.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 75 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243
(1895)).
89
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Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that the Court should
define testimonial at the time of the Crawford decision.97 His
position was that the many state and federal prosecutors
should not be “left in the dark” as to what types of statements
are testimonial.98
V.

COMMONWEALTH V. GONSALVES

Guided by the decision in Crawford, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts [hereinafter “SJC”] created its own
landmark ruling in the 2005 case Commonwealth v.
Gonsalves.99 The SJC’s holding in this case is more
conservative than the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in
Crawford and contrary in direction to that of most other
states.
A. Facts
On March 16, 2003, the victim and Gonsalves, the
victim’s boyfriend, were in the victim’s bedroom.100 The
victim’s mother was in her own bedroom located two doors
down.101 The mother overheard an argument between the
victim and Gonsalves, which included “yelling, screaming,
and crying.”102 When the mother went to see what was going
on she found the victim crying on her bed and Gonsalves
gone.103 The victim told her mother that she and Gonsalves
had an argument during which Gonsalves grabbed her shirt so
tight she could not breathe and he then hit her.104
Shortly thereafter, the police arrived and stated that they
received a call about a “domestic disturbance.”105 The victim
and her mother did not make the call to the police.106
97

Id. at 75-76.
Id.
99
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 552 (Mass. 2005).
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
98
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When the police arrived, the victim was “crying and
hysterical, ranting, loud, hyperventilating and pacing around
the room.”107 She had no obvious injuries.108 One of the
officers asked the victim what happened and she responded
that her boyfriend grabbed her, choked her, and hit her head
on the floor.109 She named Gonsalves as her boyfriend and
gave the police a description of him.110 An ambulance
arrived and took the victim to the hospital.111 Gonsalves was
eventually charged with both ‘assault and battery’ and
‘assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.’112
The Commonwealth filed a motion in limine on
December 16, 2003, to allow into evidence the victim’s outof-court statements to her mother and the police under the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.113 At this
point, the victim was available to testify.114 However, she
was not called to testify and therefore not cross-examined.115
After hearing testimony from the mother and one of the
police officers, the trial court allowed the motion to admit the
hearsay statements.116
In response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Crawford, Gonsalves filed a motion for reconsideration on
March 31, 2004.117 This time, the victim invoked her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, thus
becoming unavailable to testify.118 The trial court reversed
its previous ruling, based on the decision in Crawford,
finding that the statements were made in response to police

106

Id.
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 552-53.
111
Id. at 553.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 561.
116
Id. at 553.
117
Id.
118
Id.
107
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interrogation and were testimonial in nature.119 The trial
court refused to allow the statements in evidence.120 The
Commonwealth petitioned the SJC on appeal.121
B. Holding / Rationale
In its decision, the SJC held that statements made in
response to questioning by law enforcement agents are per se
testimonial, except when the questioning is meant to secure a
volatile scene or to establish the need for and to provide
medical care.122 It also held that out-of-court statements
which are not per se testimonial should be tested to make
sure they are not testimonial in fact by “evaluating whether a
reasonable person in the declarant’s position would anticipate
his statement being used against the accused in investigating
and prosecuting a crime.”123 In Crawford, the U.S. Supreme
Court did not clearly define what types of statements are
testimonial.124 The Supreme Court did state that testimonial
statements are made during a police interrogation. The SJC
had to define “police interrogation” to determine whether the
statements made by the victim to the officers were
testimonial.125 The SJC defined the levels of “police
interrogation” as follows:
(1)
custodial
interrogation
-“[p]olice
questioning of a detained person about the
crime that he or she is suspected of having
committed”; (2) noncustodial interrogation“[p]olice questioning of a suspect who has not
been detained and can leave at will”; and (3)
investigatory interrogation-“[r]outine, non119
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accusatory questioning by the police of a
person who is not in custody.”126
Since the U.S. Supreme Court stated that it used the term
interrogation in its “colloquial” sense,127 the SJC ruled that
all questioning by any type of law enforcement agent in the
investigation or prosecution of a crime is interrogation.128
The SJC specifically excluded questioning to secure a
volatile situation or to establish the need for medical care; the
Court states that in those instances the police are providing a
community care-taking function, not investigation of a
crime.129 The SJC further stated that the community caretaking function takes effect when “there is an objectively
reasonable basis for believing that the safety of an individual
or the public is jeopardized.”130 Since statements made in
these circumstances are not considered police interrogation,
they are not testimonial per se and may be admitted upon
determination that they are not testimonial in fact.131
The SJC determined that the police officer’s questioning
of the victim was not necessary to control a volatile situation
or to determine whether medical help was needed. Therefore,
the statements the victim made to the police officers were per
se testimonial. Her statements were not admissible because
she continued to be unavailable to testify and she was not
previously subject to cross-examination at a prior hearing.132
The statements the victim made to her mother were not
per se testimonial because the mother is a private citizen, not
an agent of the police.133 Using the test to determine whether
the statements were testimonial in fact, the SJC determined
that a reasonable person, in the victim’s position, would not
126

Id. at 555 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 838 (8th ed.2004))
(emphasis added).
127
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anticipate the use of her statements in prosecuting the
defendant.134
The SJC also analyzed other states’ interpretation of
“testimonial.” An Illinois court defined “testimonial” as
“whether the statement is made or procured to prove or
establish facts in judicial proceedings.”135 The Sixth Circuit
interpreted “testimonial” as, “whether a reasonable person in
the declarant’s position would anticipate his statement being
used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting a
crime.”136 These courts construed “testimonial” in much the
same way as the SJC did.
C. Concurring Opinion
Justice Sosman’s concurring opinion states that “police
interrogation” should not include initial questioning by police
to determine why the police were called.137 According to
Justice Sosman, when police initially arrive at the scene,
“they do not know whether they will be told about a crime, an
accident, a misunderstanding, or a false alarm; nor do they
know whether anyone will report that there is some injury or
imminent danger that needs their attention.”138 Justice
Sosman claims, when police arrive at the scene, they are
performing both the community-caretaking function and the
investigative function at the same time, and with the same
questions.139 Accordingly, Justice Sosman noted that the
dictionary defined “interrogation” as “question[ing] typically
with formality, command, and thoroughness for full

134
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Id. at 562.
Id. at 557 (citing People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82 (Ill.App.Ct.

2005)).
136

Id. at 558 (citing United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th
Cir. 2004)).
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Id. at 562 (Sosman, J., concurring in the result) (Justice Sosman
concurred in the majority’s decision to remand the case in light of
Crawford, but disagreed with the majority’s analysis of Crawford. Id. at
575).
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Id. at 564.
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information and circumstantial detail.”140 She also noted that
the dictionary defined “interrogate” as “to question formally
and systematically.”141
In Justice Sosman’s view, an
interrogation does not begin until the police are actually
investigating a crime and preparing for trial, at which point
the questioning takes on an “aura of formality.”142 She also
opines that police questioning in these circumstances is not
the kind of evil the Confrontation Clause was designed to
protect against.143
Justice Sosman looked to decisions made in other states.
The Alaska Court of Appeals held that “excited responses to
brief on-the-scene questioning by police officers,” are not
testimonial as delineated in Crawford.144 The Alaska court
also claimed that this position is “the emerging majority
view” of initial police questioning upon arrival at the
scene.145 The Federal District Court in Massachusetts stated
in dicta that it was “doubtful” Crawford included
spontaneous utterances.146 A Texas court found that, “most
of the post-Crawford cases reviewing this issue have held
that initial police-victim interaction at the scene of an
140

Id at 564 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY
1182 (1993)).
141
Id. (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF LAW (1996)).
142
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Id. at 566.
144
Id. at 567 (quoting Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 356 (Alaska
Ct. App. 2005)) (The issue in Anderson was “whether [the victim’s]
response to the [police] officer’s question, ‘What happened?’, qualifies as
‘testimonial’ hearsay under Crawford.” Anderson, at 351. The Alaska
Appeals Court held that it did not, because under the facts of the case, the
victim’s response was an excited utterance and therefore was not made
“under circumstances which would lead an objective witness to
reasonably believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial.” Id. at 354 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52
(2004))).
145
Gonsalves, at 567 (citing Anderson, at 356).
146
Id. at 572 (citing United States v. Brown, 322 F.Supp.2d 101, 105
n. 4 (D. Mass, 2004)) (In Brown, the police relied on the statement, “I am
not going to jail for [the defendant] again” as a basis for probable cause to
arrest the defendant. The judge determined that the statement could be
credited as reliable either as an excited utterance or as a declaration
against penal interest. Brown, at 105).
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incident is not an interrogation….”147 These courts agree
with Justice Sosman’s view that initial police questioning at
the scene of the crime is not police interrogation.
Justice Sosman predicts there will be a negative effect on
an “overly expansive” definition of police interrogation in
prosecuting certain crimes, particularly gang-related and
domestic violence crimes.148 Also she suggests that a
“narrow” definition will violate a defendant’s right to
confrontation.149 Per the opinion, it is evident that Justice
Sosman believes the SJC should choose a definition that falls
between “overly expansive” and “narrow.”150
VI.

DAVIS V. WASHINGTON / HAMMON V. INDIANA

In June 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a pair of
cases collectively referred to as “Davis.” The Court answered
the questions left open by Crawford. Notably, the Court
ruled on the issues of confrontation and hearsay.
A. Facts
In Davis v. Washington, the victim called 911 but the
phone disconnected when the operator answered.151 The
operator called back and when the victim answered, the
operator asked her what was going on. The victim replied
147

Gonsalves, at 567 (citing Key v. State, 173 S.W.3d 72, 75
(Tex.Ct.App. 2005)) (In Key, the Texas Appeals Court opined that the
police officer “was responding to a call and was involved in the
preliminary task of securing and assessing the scene.” He was “not
producing evidence in anticipation of a potential criminal prosecution
when he encountered [the victim]. The “unstructured interaction”
between the police officer and the victim was not an “interrogation” in
the sense used in Crawford. In addition, the victim had just suffered
physical abuse and had no time to think about it. Therefore, the statement
was most likely truthful, and not made in contemplation of use in a future
trial. Key, at 76).
148
Gonsalves, at 574.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2270, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224,
234 (2006).
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that “[h]e’s here jumping on me again.”152 While Davis was
still in the house the operator ascertained his full name.153
Davis then ran out of the house and at that point the operator
questioned the victim about the events leading up to the
attack.154 The police arrived shortly after the call to 911 and
found the victim shaken, with “fresh injuries on her forearm
and her face.”155
Davis was charged with felony violation of a no-contact
order. The only witnesses that testified were the police
officers who responded to the emergency 911 call.156 The
victim was available to testify but did not.157 The court
admitted the tape-recorded emergency call over Davis’s
objection and he was convicted.158 The Washington Court of
Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction.159
In Hammon v. Indiana, the police responded to a
“domestic disturbance” call at the home of Hammon and his
wife, the victim.160 The victim was found to be “somewhat
frightened” on the front porch.161 She told them nothing was
wrong but allowed them to enter the house where they
noticed that a heating unit in the living room was broken,
with flames coming out and glass on the floor.162 Hammon
told the police that he and his wife had an argument, that
everything was all right now, and that it had not become
physical.163
One of the officers took the victim into another room to
hear her side of the story and Hammon got mad when the
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officer would not let him into the room.164 After hearing the
victim’s side, the officer had her fill out a battery affidavit.
In the affidavit the victim wrote that Hammon broke the
heater, pushed her down into the broken glass, hit her, and
attacked her daughter.165
Hammon was charged with domestic battery and
probation violation.166 The victim was subpoenaed but failed
to appear at trial.167 The prosecution called the officer who
spoke to the victim and asked him to testify as to what the
victim told him and to authenticate the affidavit.168 Hammon
objected, but the trial court admitted the victim’s statement
under the spontaneous utterance exception and the affidavit
under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay
rule.169 Hammon was found guilty and convicted. The
Indiana Court of Appeals and the Indiana Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction.170
B. Holding / Rationale
The U.S. Supreme Court raised the concern that these
cases are not as clear as Crawford and that they would have
to more clearly define what types of police interrogations
generate testimonial statements.171 The Court determined
that a statement is testimonial when there is no ongoing
emergency and the main purpose of the interrogation is to
prove past criminal events. On the other hand, the Court
determined that a statement is not testimonial when the main
purpose of the interrogation is to take care of an ongoing
emergency. Whether a statement is testimonial or not is an
objective test.172
164
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When the victim in the Davis case called 911 she was
describing “events as they were actually happening, rather
than ‘des[cribing] past events.’”173 The Court reasoned that
the 911 emergency call was not testimonial until Davis left
the house (when the emergency ended). Since the only issue
before the Court was whether the early statements made to
the 911 operator were testimonial, the Court ruled that they
were not and upheld Davis’s conviction.174
In Hammon, unlike in Davis, the court found that the
police arrived after the emergency.175 Therefore, the officer
who took the victim’s statement was trying to find out what
had already occurred.176 The Court determined that the
victim’s statement was formal, like that given in Crawford,
because the officer took her into a separate room, would not
let Hammon in, and questioned her on how the events
evolved.177 They found the statements “inherently
testimonial.”178 The Court did recognize that many times in
emergencies an initial police questioning will not produce
testimonial results. However, that was not the case in
Hammon.179
The Court acknowledged the difficulty in prosecuting
domestic violence crimes suggesting that the forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine would suffice.180 In this doctrine
someone who ensures the unavailability of a witness forfeits
his or her right to confrontation.181 The government has to
prove the wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.182
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Id. at 2276, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 240 (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527
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THE EXTENSION OF THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE IS UNWARRANTED

In 1895, in Mattox v. United States, the Supreme Court
opined that it was “bound to interpret the Constitution in the
light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted, not as
reaching out for new guaranties of the rights of the
citizens.”183 The Court’s decision in Davis, however,
guarantees new rights to criminal defendants.
“The exception for [excited utterances] is at least two
centuries old … and may date back to the late seventeenth
century.”184 The Sixth Amendment was adopted in 1791.185
Thus, the excited utterance exception existed at the time of
the adoption of the Sixth Amendment. If the Framers of the
Constitution had intended for the Confrontation Clause to
supplant the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule,
they would have made that clear when they drafted the Sixth
Amendment. The Court in Mattox recognized the “dying
declaration” exception based on reliability, not on whether it
was testimonial. “[T]he sense of impending death is
presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to
enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as would the
obligation of an oath.”186 The Court stated that reliability has
been the measure of whether a hearsay statement is
admissible for over 200 years and there is no reason for that
to change now.187
According to the Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence,
one of the reasons for the creation of hearsay exceptions is
the “necessity for the evidence the rule would otherwise
exclude.”188 To exclude victims’ statements to police in
domestic violence cases could potentially give defendants a
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“get-out-of-jail-free card.”189 There is no reason to give
defendants a get-out-of-jail-free card because the types of
statements now inadmissible under Davis are not the same
types of ex parte statements the Confrontation Clause was
designed to protect. No longer does a law enforcement agent
read a statement into the record, and the defendant get
convicted based on that statement alone. Law enforcement
agents also testify about “the complainant’s physical
appearance, her screams, her medical records, and
photographs … and the fact that no one else was in a position
to have inflicted [the victim’s] injuries.”190 In addition, when
a hearsay statement is admitted into evidence the declarant’s
credibility may be attacked as if the declarant was on the
stand testifying.191 Fact finders have more evidence to
consider in the twenty-first century than they did in the
sixteenth or seventeenth century. Trials today are not limited
to just a deposition or affidavit that is read into the record.
The United States uses the adversarial system, where counterargument and cross-examination are used to ferret out the
truth. Hearsay exceptions were created out of necessity. It is
erroneous for the Court to arbitrarily exclude evidence which
hearsay exceptions were designed to allow in evidence.
In addition, it appears from the Davis decision that
emergency medical technicians [hereinafter “EMTs”] who
arrive at the scene would not be barred from testifying to
statements made by the victim since EMTs are not law
enforcement agents. In other words, the same hearsay
statements that would not be admissible post-Davis under the
excited utterance or present sense impression exception for
police officer testimony would be admissible under the
statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment exception192 when an EMT testifies. Hearsay is
hearsay regardless of what exception allows it into evidence.
The job of EMTs is to save lives. It is detrimental to public
189
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health to take an EMT away from his or her job to testify at
court to a statement that the responding police officer could
just as easily testify to and is within the police officer’s
duties.
It is unlikely that the Court, in 2006, has a better idea of
what the Framers intended than it did in 1895. Absent new
findings regarding the intent of the Framers of the Sixth
Amendment, the extension of the Confrontation Clause in
Davis and Crawford is unwarranted because exceptions to the
hearsay rule have existed for centuries and the civil law
method of criminal procedure is not used in the United States.
VIII. EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT VERSUS
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to face
their accusers.193 However, this right must be balanced
against the need for effective law enforcement. States have a
compelling interest in protecting victims of domestic
violence. The most effective way to prosecute this type of
crime, in cases where the victim recants or refuses to testify,
is to use the excited utterance hearsay exception which allows
the responding police officers to testify as to the victim’s
statements. In reaching its decision in Davis, the Supreme
Court unnecessarily tipped the scale in favor of the criminal
defendant.
A. Constitutional Rights
There are numerous circumstances where the U.S.
Supreme Court has refused to unnecessarily extend
constitutional rights. For example, the Fourth Amendment
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures; yet, there
are exceptions to the warrant requirement, which the Court
has consistently upheld. These exceptions include: plain
view, exigent circumstances, searches incident to arrest, and
consent searches. Additionally, in Michigan Dep’t of State
193

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

2007

What About the Victims?

327

Police v. Sitz, the Court rejected the argument that sobriety
checkpoints are unreasonable seizures, stating the interest in
eliminating drunk drivers outweighs minimal invasion of
drivers’ privacy interests.194 In Terry v. Ohio, a police officer
stopped the defendants and patted them down before he had
probable cause to arrest them.195 The Court rejected the
unreasonable search and seizure argument pointing to the
interest of “crime prevention and detection,”196 and stating “it
is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may in appropriate manner approach a person for
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.”197 The
Court held in New York v. Quarles that there is a “public
safety” exception to the Sixth Amendment Miranda
warnings.198
In Quarles, the defendant was arrested in a grocery store
and had hidden a gun somewhere inside the store.199 The
Court went on to state that “the need for answers to questions
in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs
the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.”200 Over
one hundred years ago, the Court acknowledged that
constitutional rights, “however beneficent in their operation
and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the
case.”201
The Court’s decision in Davis fails to recognize the
safety of victims of domestic violence, the states’ interest in
protecting those victims, and the interest of crime prevention.
This allows the abuser to go free from incarceration, where
the abuser may continue to hurt the victim and any children
194
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who are forced to witness the abuse. If an abuser goes free,
this will put other unsuspecting people in danger as well.
Further, if the abuser is freed, there is no incentive for him or
her to get help in order to break the cycle of abuse. If the state
is unable to successfully prosecute the abuser, why should the
abuser attempt to seek help? Permitting the abuser to go free
may also limit the victims from seeking help since, generally
speaking, the only time the victim is truly free from the
abuser is when the abuser is incarcerated. States have a
compelling interest to keep domestic abusers off the streets.
In Hudson v. Michigan, decided merely days before
Davis, the Court refused to suppress evidence found during a
search where the police violated the knock and announce
rule.202 It opined that:
Suppression of evidence, however, has always
been our last resort, not our first impulse. The
exclusionary rule generates ‘substantial social
costs,’ … which sometimes include setting the
guilty free and the dangerous at large. We
have therefore been ‘cautious against
expanding’ it, … and have repeatedly
emphasized that the rule’s ‘costly toll’ upon
truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives
presents a high obstacle for those urging [its]
application.203
The Court’s decision in Davis is contrary to its decision in
Hudson. Failing to allow the police to testify as to the
statements made by the victim in domestic violence cases
effectively “suppresses” the evidence against the defendant
and quite possibly allows a criminal to go free. In Davis, the
Court failed to weigh the “substantial social costs”204 of not
allowing hearsay evidence under the excited utterance
202

Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct 2159, 2163 (2006).
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exception, thus potentially allowing an abuser to go free
against the “truth-seeking and law enforcement
objectives.”205
One solution to these injustices is to create an “exigency”
or “public safety” exception to the Confrontation Clause in
domestic violence cases. The Court recognized in Hudson
that the Fourth Amendment knock and announce requirement
“is not necessary … if there is ‘reason to believe that
evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were
given….’”206 Similarly, in domestic violence cases it is
possible that the witness will recant or disappear before the
case goes to trial, “destroying” vital evidence. For example,
when a victim of domestic violence knows in advance that
her or his testimony is needed at trial, the victim has time to
recant or refuse to testify. Prosecutors are aware of this, and
have reason to believe that there is a likelihood that they will
lose their witness. If they lose their witness, and the
responding police officer is not allowed to testify to the
statements the victim made at the scene, it is likely the
defendant will not be able to be prosecuted. That would be
an exigent circumstance and would require an immediate
solution. The solution would be an exception to the Sixth
Amendment in the one limited circumstance of domestic
violence since the evidence (the victim’s testimony) would
likely be destroyed if advance notice were given (by refusal
to testify or recanting). The exception could also be called a
public safety exception since protecting victims, children, or
the unsuspecting public from an abuser could be considered
public safety. This solution is compatible with the Court’s
decision in Hudson.
B. Functions of the Police
With regard to the role of police officers, there is no
difference between the “investigatory function” and the
“community caretaking” function of the police. Both
205
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functions fall within the general category of law enforcement.
As Justice Sosman pointed out in her concurring opinion in
Gonsalves, when the police respond to an emergency 911 call
they do not know what to expect.207 They do not know
whether anyone needs medical assistance or whether there is
a dangerous situation they will need to control. The majority
points out in Gonsalves that the defendant had left the scene
when the police arrived and concluded that there was no
ongoing emergency.208 However, the SJC failed to address
the fact that Gonsalves could have returned after the police
left. In addition, nothing in the facts, as given in the SJC’s
decision, indicates that the police knew Gonsalves was gone
when they arrived. For all the police knew, Gonsalves could
have been hiding in another room. The fact that the victim
had no visible marks on her did not mean that she was not
injured or in need of medical care. In Commonwealth v.
Foley, decided on the same day as Gonsalves, the SJC
allowed statements by a child that the defendant was hiding
in another room and statements made by the victim about her
need for medical care because she had marks on her.209 If
Gonsalves was hiding in the bathroom and the victim had a
scratch on her, the case would likely have been decided
differently because it would essentially be the same case as
Foley.
Justice Thomas notes, in his concurring opinion in Davis,
that the attack in Hammon on the victim was not actually
happening when she was describing it to the 911 operator.210
He also points out that the defendant could have been an
ongoing danger to his wife since he was still in the house.211
Additionally, the police did not know what he was going to
do after they left.
The facts of Davis, Hammon, and Gonsalves are very
similar and should have been decided the same way. In all
207
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three cases the police were performing their basic job
“function” – law enforcement. Distinguishing between the
two “functions” of securing a volatile scene or investigating a
crime impedes the law enforcement procedure, and hinders
the prosecution of domestic violence crimes.
IX.

USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CASES

“Battered-woman syndrome” [hereinafter “BWS”] may
cause a victim to refuse to testify against the abuser or recant
prior statements made implicating the abuser. This could
hinder the prosecution of an abuser post-Davis, if statements
made by the victim to the responding police officer are not
allowed into evidence unless the victim testifies at trial.
However, in order to help the jury to understand the unusual
behavior of BWS victims, such as refusing to testify at trial,
many courts allow expert testimony on the subject.212
BWS is one of many types of a subcategory of posttraumatic stress disorder.213 It is “a series of common
characteristics found in women who are abused both
physically and emotionally by the dominant male figures in
their lives over a prolonged length of time.”214 Some effects
of the syndrome are low self-esteem and emotional
dependence on the abuser.215 The abusive relationship is
cyclical and consists of three stages: the tension-building
stage, the violent stage, and the honeymoon stage.216 BWS
causes the victim to feel responsible for the beatings, thus
accepting the beatings, but hoping each one is the last.217
With regard to expert testimony, since the rules of
evidence vary from state to state, the admission of expert
212
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testimony regarding BWS varies depending on what
jurisdiction the case is in. Some courts allow the expert to
testify as to the traits of the “typical” BWS victim generally,
but others require proof that the victim suffers from BWS.218
Although expert testimony regarding the symptoms of BWS
appears helpful to the prosecution, it is not without problems.
First, it costs money to hire an expert. In the absence of
police testimony, the state will have to rely more often on the
testimony of experts, which becomes cost-prohibitive.
Second, as previously stated, the rules regarding admission of
expert testimony are not consistent since the rules of evidence
vary among jurisdictions. For example, Ohio only allows the
introduction of evidence of BWS when the victim is a
defendant claiming self-defense.219 Other issues that have
caused concern are relevance of the evidence, prejudicial
impact of the evidence, and that the evidence shows “the
defendant’s propensity to be a batterer.”220 Since domestic
violence is a nation-wide public safety concern, it requires a
consistent solution.
BWS is a medically recognized
condition, so there is no reason why a victim should be able
to introduce evidence of BWS in one state, but not in another
state.
For example, a New York court determined that the
probative value of an expert’s testimony on BWS outweighed
the possibility of unfair prejudice to the defendant.221 The
trial court admitted the expert testimony because it was
offered only in order to help the jury understand why the
victim recanted her previous accusation against the defendant
during her grand jury testimony.222 On the other hand, the
Ohio Appeals Court reversed a conviction for domestic
violence on the grounds that the danger of unfair prejudice to
the defendant outweighed the probative value of the expert
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testimony.223 In the Ohio case, the testimony was only being
offered to explain why the victim would return home if the
defendant had really beaten her.224 Comparing these two
cases, it seems that if the Ohio defendant had beaten his
victim in New York, his conviction would not have been
overturned.
Although costly, prosecutors will have to rely more on
experts in the wake of the Davis decision. One solution to
cure the inconsistencies of admitting expert testimony is to
create a special rule for experts testifying in domestic
violence cases in the Federal Rules of Evidence. This would
not guarantee consistency but it will help since most states’
rules are similar to the Federal Rules. The rule should state
that when there is a question of domestic violence, expert
testimony as to the general character traits of BWS victims
should be allowed into evidence so long as the expert does
not diagnose the victim, and the testimony does not show the
propensity of the defendant to be a batterer. A special rule
for experts testifying in domestic violence cases would be
particularly helpful post-Davis.
X.

FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING

In Davis, the Court suggested using the forfeiture by
wrongdoing hearsay exception225 instead of the excited
utterance or present sense impression hearsay exceptions.
However, the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception is not
helpful because it adds a step to the prosecution of the
defendant. Under this hearsay exception, a defendant who
causes the absence of a witness by means of wrongdoing
gives up his right to confront that witness.226 In that instance,
223
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the out-of-court statements would likely be allowed into
evidence.227 The Court did not give an opinion as to the
standard required to prove forfeiture except to say, under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the government has to prove
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.228
However, if a victim is under duress from the defendant not
to testify at trial, it is unlikely that she would admit to
prosecutors that the duress is the reason she refuses to testify.
This would make it hard for prosecutors to prove forfeiture
by wrongdoing because they would not have any evidence of
wrongdoing on the part of the defendant. Using the forfeiture
by wrongdoing exception, the government would have to first
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant
caused the victim’s unavailability in order to get the
statement admitted into evidence, and then at trial, prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime. Adding an extra step to the legal process is not a good
solution. In addition, BWS often causes the victim to refuse
to testify on her own initiative, without any wrongdoing on
the part of the defendant.229
Under these circumstances, the forfeiture by wrongdoing
exception would be of no help. The statements are hearsay
whether they are allowed in evidence under the excited
utterance exception, the present sense impression exception,
or the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception. Switching to the
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception will still allow the same
statements into evidence, but make it harder to prosecute the
abuser because of the added step of proving wrongdoing.
This could leave the abuser free to abuse the victim again.
XI.

CONCLUSION

The extension of the Confrontation Clause is
unwarranted, outweighed by the need for effective law
enforcement, and cost-prohibitive if the use of expert
testimony increases. However, lower courts are bound by the
227
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Davis decision until a more sympathetic case changes the
U.S. Supreme Court’s mind.
A fact pattern that may cause the U.S. Supreme Court to
reconsider its holding in Davis might be this: A state is
unable to prosecute an abuser because the victim refuses to
testify at the defendant’s trial. The victim identified the
abuser to the police upon their arrival at the scene, but the
statements were not allowed into evidence because they were
testimonial under Davis. Therefore, the defendant is not
prosecuted or is acquitted because the state cannot meet its
burden of proof. The victim returns to the abuser either
because she believes his false promises that he is sorry and
will not abuse her anymore, or because she has nowhere else
to go. As projected, another cycle of abuse begins; one of
two things may occur: The abuser beats the victim to death or
the victim kills the abuser in self-defense. Although
unfortunate and extreme, murder may be necessary before the
current law changes. Under the prior Roberts “indicia of
reliability” test, the hearsay statements made by the victim
would have been allowed into evidence and a death may have
been prevented.
“There is virtually no evidence of what the drafters of the
Confrontation Clause intended it to mean.”230 Nevertheless,
it most likely was not intended as an escape hatch for
criminals to use in order to avoid prosecution. That is what
could happen if the Davis decision is upheld.
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